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A Force Management Update



A Quarterly Newsletter of the Army Force Management School

15 April 2006

THE ARSTRUC

- The ARSTRUC has been published and distributed.
- ARSTRUC is dated 7 April 2006. The associated memorandum of record (signed by BG Formica) is dated 11 April 2006.
- Memorandum (SUBJECT: "Release of the POM 08-13 Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Message") states that the ARSTRUC does not reflect Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 decisions affecting ARNG force rebalancing. Further, G-37 /FM notes that additional adjustments will be incorporated into the POM 08-13 ARSTRUC message addendum to be published in the June 2006 timeframe

TAA UPDATE

Force Management Review 09-13.

HQDA G-3/7 (Force Management) has completed the TAA 08-13 effort. During the ten months of process and decision making several additional Force Design Updates (FDU) decisions have been accomplished along with additional guidance from OSD, including the distribution of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2005).

Accordingly the G-3/7 has initiated the Force Management Review (FMR) 09-13 to provide a force file by December 2006 to feed the FY 09-13 POM update, address residual TAA 08-13 issues and QDR 2005 impacts. Included in the FMR 09-13 objectives are efforts to balance the COMPOs and capabilities within the combat, combat support and combat service support.

The time line for FMR 09-13 started with a kick-off meeting in February 2006 and runs through December 2006. Included in the effort is a tie in to the TAA 10-15 timeline and efforts, a thorough review of the Rules of Allocation (ROA), Force Program Review (FPR) and QDR execution, updated Consolidated TOE Update (CTU), TTHS resolution and integration of Decision Points 57, 58 and 78.

Jim Camp

HQDA ALIGNMENT

As I am sure most of you are aware, Decision Point (DP) 58 provided a new headquarters alignment. Additionally DP 58 provided approval of (1) Headquarters Definitions, (2) Headquarters Alignment, and (3) Headquarters Relationships.

The definitions are provided in the first slide. The second slide displays the former Army MACOMs versus the three new categories (1) Army Command, (2) Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and (3) Direct Reporting Units (DRU).

Headquarters Definitions

<p>Army Command:</p> <p>An Army force, designated by the Secretary of the Army, performing multiple Army Service Title 10 functions (3013b) across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with administrative control (ADCON).</p>	<p>Army Service Component Command (ASCC):</p> <p>An Army force, designated by the Secretary of the Army, comprised primarily of operational organizations serving as the Army component for a combatant commander. If designated by the combatant commander, serves as a Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC), or Joint Task Force (JTF). Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with operational control (OPCON) and ADCON.</p>
<p>Direct Reporting Unit (DRU):</p> <p>An Army organization comprised of one or more units with institutional or operational functions, designated by the Secretary of the Army, providing broad general support to the Army in a normally single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. Direct Reporting Units report directly to a Headquarters, Department of the Army principal and / or Army Command and operate under authorities established by the Secretary of the Army.</p>	
<p>Field Operating Agency (FOA): No Change Staff Supporting Agency (SSA): No Change</p> <p>Decision: Secretary of the Army Approved ON 14 December 2005</p>	

GO 5 - New Headquarters Alignment

MACOMS	Army Command	Army Service Component Command (ASCC)	Direct Reporting Unit (DRU)
TRADOC AMC INSCOM CIDC MDW MEDCOM	FORSCOM* TRADOC AMC	Army Europe Army Central Army North Army South Army Pacific USASOC SDDC SMDC / ARSTRAT EUSA **	NETCOM MEDCOM INSCOM CIDC USACE MDW ATEC USMA USARC Acq Spt Ctr IMA
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">USA SMDC</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">USAREUR*</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">FORSCOM</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">USARPAC*</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">3d U. S. Army</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">USARSO*</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">USASOC*</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">SDDC</div>			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; background-color: #90EE90; display: inline-block;">EUSA</div>			

*Serves as the Army Component to JFCOM

**Serves as the Army Service Component Command to USFK until conditions in Korea no longer require an Army level HQ

Note: Remaining FOAs and SSA unchanged

Jim Camp

LEAN SIX SIGMA HITS FORCE MANAGEMENT

So the Army is just humming along, operating at maximum efficiency, all squared away, no complaints, right? No??? OK, round up the usual suspects, the real smart ones, call a meeting and let's get that stuff fixed! What, that doesn't work - it just leads to more meetings and busywork? Maybe what we need is a framework for examining the way we do business and then we could revise our processes to be faster, or deliver better quality or lower our costs, or heck, even all three of those. Folks, Lean six Sigma (LSS) is that framework. The Secretary of the Army certainly thinks so, because he has created an office of the Deputy Undersecretary for Business Transformation (the DUSA-BT is Mr. Mike Kirby). To ensure LSS implementation across the HQDA staff, each one of the G-staff has a high-level Deployment Director (Mr. Cliff Dickey for G-3). Also, the CSA has endorsed LSS.

Now that the top cover is in place, all we need is some results. To that end, on 6 March 2006 the Secretary announced that 15 areas in the Army would be subjected to Value Stream Analysis (VSA). Essentially, VSA is where LSS tools are used to analyze and reduce each process to its most efficient and effective state. Four of those 15 process improvement areas are being led by G-3: Force Management, Mobilization, Capabilities Development, and ARFORGEN. G-8 is the leader for Equipping.

Within G-37, LTC Jill Newman is the LSS/Business Transformation Officer and recently organized a VSA strategy session chaired by COL Bill Bickel, Deputy Director of G-3 Force Management. The session picked four topics for further study and development: Stationing, Force Validation Committee, Out-of-Cycle MTOEs, and Equipping (documentation perspective). One of the principles of LSS deployment is to start small with lower-level projects, gain success and eventually transform processes. That's what you will see over next few months; so don't look for a wholesale revision of the force development process too soon, for instance.

Is LSS just the latest flavor-of-the-month management improvement initiative? We've all seen that before, but this one has a proven track record in private enterprise and considerable institutional structure deployment. Time will tell.

Dave Retherford

THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES (CNGR)

The decade of the 1990's saw unprecedented mobilization of the United States Reserve Components. Between Desert Shield/Desert Storm and September 11th, 2001, some 400,000 Guard and Reserve Soldiers were called to active duty. But that was just the beginning, post September 11th, 2001 to date approximately 445,000 Guard and Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized.

Currently, our Selected Reserve numbers about 829,000. By 1 November 2005, 382,424 Selected Reserve men and women or 46% of the category had served on active duty. You would have to go back to the Korean War more than half a century ago to find comparable statistics.¹

The first half of the first decade of the 21st century has seen a "utilization" transformation of the Reserve Components that has been nothing short of spectacular. From a force held for over 200 years in "Strategic Reserve", the Reserve Components have transitioned to an "Operational Reserve" in less than 5 years.²

¹ The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, "Did You Know?" article, <http://www.cngr.gov/resource-center.did-you-know.asp?>

² See Quadrennial Defense Review Report February 6, 2006, "A Continuum of Service", pp.76-77.
<http://www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>

The pace of global strategic operations since September 11th, 2001 has provided little time to thoroughly examine and analyze this dramatic shift in employment of the Reserve Components. The exigencies of the moment have provided little time to catch our breath much less the time to determine the impacts of using our “citizen soldiers” to effectuate United States foreign policy, or to ascertain how this sea state change in employment of Reserve Forces will affect the traditional relationship between the Active and Reserve Components, or to discern possible consequences to the fundamental constitutional relationship between the federal government and the States as a result of continued extraterritorial utilization of the National Guard. Not to mention determining the impacts on Reserve Component Soldiers and their families.

These important questions, as well as others, energized the United States Congress to mandate the first structured, autonomous, and detailed appraisal of the National Guard and the Reserves in more than 50 years. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005 established the “Commission on the National Guard and Reserves” to conduct the assessment.

The Commission consisting of 13 members, 3 each appointed by the chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, 2 each appointed by the ranking minority member of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and 3 each appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the Secretary designating a Chairman from the appointees, has a year long charter to assess the Reserve Components and propose necessary “changes in law and policy to ensure that the Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of the United States”.³ The threshold issue for the Commission to address is one of function as opposed to form that is “what are the appropriate roles and purposes of the Guard and Reserves in meeting the national security needs of the United States?”

The Commission held its initial hearing in March 2006 and was immediately challenged to consider a very difficult and controversial issue. The Senate National Guard Caucus co-chaired by Senators Leahy and Bond presented the Commission with a legislative proposal to elevate the Chief, National Guard Bureau to the four star General Officer level with a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Commission will address many other challenging issues between now and March 2007 when its final report is due. We, however, will not have to wait that long to learn the initial findings of the Commission. The implementing statute requires the Commission to submit a preliminary report to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees within 3 months of their first meeting. By June 2006 we should have a good indication of the Commission’s assessment approach and the direction they are headed.

John Walsh

STATE DEFENSE FORCES (aka State Guards, State Military Reserves, or State Militias)

Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the United States Constitution prohibits States from maintaining “Troops” during peacetime without congressional approval. The United States Congress has seen fit to provide statutory approval for the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia to maintain National Guard and State Defense forces (SDF).⁴ Title 32 U.S.C. Section 109 simultaneously affirms the constitutional prohibition on States maintaining troops in peacetime and authorizes the establishment and maintenance of State National Guard and State Defense Forces.

SDF trace their point of origin back to World War I when they were established, as much needed backfill for federalized and deployed State National Guard forces. SDF filled a critical vacuum on the “home front” by assuming essential state mission responsibilities (disaster relief, “coastline and infrastructure” security, and support to civil authorities) of the deployed State Guard forces. Similarly, during World War II, some 200,000 State Defense Forces substituted for federalized State National Guard. In 1980 the Cold War possibility that State National Guard, as the Strategic Reserve for the Active Force, might once

³ The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, “Authorizing Statute Public Law 108-375”, <http://www.cngr.gov/about-us.authorizing-statute.asp> and “Fact Sheet”, <http://www.cngr.gov/about-us.fact-sheet.asp>.

⁴ 32 U.S.C. § 109 Maintenance of other troops.

again be mobilized and deployed to fight a European war rekindled support for SDF. Today SDF number about 14,000 members and are actively engaged supporting government authorities in more than 20 States.

Most recently, Hurricane Katrina drew attention to State military forces. SDF in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia were activated in the wake of Katrina to support State National Guard, provide security, and operate shelters. Working without pay, 100 Virginia SDF volunteers secured armories and assisted deployment thereby freeing up more Virginia National Guard soldiers for Gulf Coast duty. Impressively, the State of Maryland provided an SDF “medical team” of 81 personnel to assist the State of Louisiana. This demonstrated indispensable requirement for SDF during a catastrophic natural disaster that overwhelmed local responders from the start coupled with the high probability that State National Guard forces will continue to be deployed overseas generated the introduction of H.R. 3401, a bill entitled “The State Defense Force Improvement Act of 2005”, in the House of Representatives on 21 July 2005.

H.R. 3401 would “amend Title 32 United States Code to improve the readiness of State defense forces and to increase military coordination for homeland security between the States and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.” Specifically, the heading for Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 would be changed from “Maintenance of other troops” to “Maintenance of other troops: State defense forces” and the statute altered to acknowledge SDF as an essential military element for homeland security and to establish a direct relationship of cooperation and support between State SDF and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. DoD would be authorized to provide “equipment and facilities” in support of SDF training to include the transfer of “excess” equipment. SDF training with DoD and HLS would be discretionary on the part of the individual States. However, DoD funding for SDF would not be permitted and personal injury as well as consequent damage liability would be a sole responsibility of the States.⁵

John Walsh

FA 50 TRAINING

The Army Force Management School (AFMS) will conduct the FY 2005 Functional Area (FA) 50 Qualification Course from 10 July to 15 September 2006. This course is designed for officers (CPT - LTC) and their civilian counterparts assigned to force management and force integration positions that have completed the four-week Army Force Management Course (modules I thru III). Currently, there are 19 Active Component students identified for attendance. Training will be conducted at AFMS, Building 247, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (Humphreys Hall).

This course focuses the student on current force management policies, procedures, processes and systems and prepares them to perform force management functions at all levels throughout the Army. The program of instruction is designed for officers and their civilian counterparts who will be involved in the entire spectrum of force management, force integration, requirements generation, and materiel acquisition processes, and in the planning, programming, budgeting and execution system at Army commands or at Headquarters, Department of the Army. Instruction is accomplished by using lecture conferences, guided discussions, case studies, workshops, practical exercises, seminars, guest speakers, evaluations and critiques.

Training addresses the force management processes from the determination of force requirements, the development of solutions to these requirements (doctrinal, material, etc.), and the allocation of resources to accomplish Army functions and missions. The course includes instruction and practical exercises in strategic guidance, combat development, materiel development and force development processes, as well as the planning, programming and budgeting of resources. Instruction includes numerous presentations from members of the Army Staff (ARSTAF) and MACOMs involved with the many facets of force management as well as a visit to Congress and a Staff Ride to a historic battlefield. G-8, FD is the FA50 ARSTAF proponent.

⁵ Carafano, James Jay, Ph.D., and John R. Brinkerhoff, “Katrina’s Forgotten Responders: State Defense Forces Play a Vital Role”, Executive Memorandum, No. 984, The Heritage Foundation, October 5, 2005.

ORGANIZATION DESIGN PRIMER FOR FA50S

Numerous articles analyzing the military relief efforts in response to Hurricane Katrina mention that National Guard units have special training and organization to deal with natural disasters. Obviously, those reporters have not done their homework. I suspect there are many active duty personnel who may have some similar misconceptions. Many FA50 officers will spend more time working organization design and structure issues than any other facet of their force management responsibilities. Knowledge of how organization designs are created, approved, and changed is a useful addition to the FA 50 toolbox.

Organizational design changes are normally made by one of the following methods:

- *Administrative changes* – any soldier, unit, or agency can submit a recommended change through their chain of command utilizing DA Form 2028. A variation of this is being used during the US Army Force Management Agency (USAFMSA) Documentation Analysis and Review Team (DART) process whereby units scheduled for a DART submit recommended changes using USAFMSA's DART Tool. Issues must be approved by the submitter's chain of command before entry into the DART Tool. Organization design issues will be coordinated with TRADOC Force Design Division (FDD) before final approval.

- *Military Occupational Classification & Structure (MOCS) Adjustments* – These changes are developed, approved, and distributed by HRC utilizing the Notification of Future Change (NOFC) process. USAFMSA receives these NOFCs and administratively applies the changes to TOEs.

- *Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP)* – BOIPs are requirements documents that create modernization building blocks to transition base TOEs (BTOE) into objective TOEs (OTOE). BOIPs add, delete, or change principal equipment and associated support equipment and personnel to the TOE.

- *Capability Development Document (CDD)* – As part of the Joint Capabilities Integration Documentation System (JCIDS), the CDD documents a requirement for a new or changed capability for an organization. Approval of the CDD precedes development of the BOIP.

- *Force Design Update (FDU)* – This is the primary method of changing designs of existing organizations and creating new designs. There are two regular FDU cycles per year and infrequent out of cycle updates. The FDU Jr is an abbreviated procedure used for minor changes normally approved below HQDA level. The FDU process ensures the integration of force planning with other development issues prioritized in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to meet Army force program requirements.

- *Major Redesign/Restructuring Initiatives* – These are large-scale redesign efforts by the Army that utilize many of the same procedures of, but are coordinated separately from, the FDU process. Examples of these include the recent modularity designs, the Aviation Restructuring Initiative, and the Medical Restructuring Initiative.

While most designs or design changes are a result of continual assessments conducted by TRADOC and non-TRADOC combat developers, recommendations can originate with any soldier or organization through the chain of command via the DA Form 2028 process. Non-DA sources can also recommend changes, i.e., the Rand Corporation recently proposed creation of ten new 900-soldier battalions from the National Guard that would focus exclusively on homeland defense. Some new or changed design recommendations are a result of major concepts approved by the CSA/VCSA (i.e., Aviation Transformation or Modularity). Regardless of the origin of a recommendation, it will all end up at the functional proponent (TRADOC school, USASOC, or AMEDD) for review and action. The proponent conducts a DOTMLPF analysis of recommended changes. If the decision is to seek an organizational design change, the proponent will submit an FDU Packet to FDD. The packet consists of a concept (operational concept, organizational concept, and concept of change), an organizational design paper, a Unit Ref-

erence Sheet (URS), and a Letter of Transmittal signed by the Commandant or his designated representative. FDD accepts the package for inclusion in the next FDU cycle or processes the request as an out-of-cycle FDU.

FDD hosts a video-teleconference review of FDU issues. This review includes participation from HQTRADOC, CASCOM, OCAR, NGB, HQDA (DAMO-FMF lead with G1, G4, DAO-FMO, USAFMSA, G8), FORSCOM, proponent, and others as required by the specific issues. The Chief, FDD, may decide to process the request as an FDU Jr, which has expedited time-lines. The review board determines that the proposed issue is sufficiently developed to forward to the Director, Requirements Integration Directorate for release for field staffing or identifies potential implementation issues requiring resolution. Upon acceptance into the FDU process, the proposal transitions from a proponent to a HQ, TRADOC issue. Concurrent with FDD processing and field staffing, the HQDA staff led by DAMO-FMF conducts an Initial Force Integration Functional Analysis (FIFA) to determine supportability, validate requirements shortfalls and need for the new capability, and identify potential implementation issues for action.

After field-staffing issues have been resolved and based on the nature of the FDU, the Director, TRADOC Futures Center, or the Commander, CAC, makes a final determination on the requirement for the CG, TRADOC, and forwards the recommended designs to HQDA, G3 (DAMO-FM), for requirements approval. G3 accepts or rejects the TRADOC determined requirement. If accepted and needed bill payers are identified, the design issue goes to the VCSA for approval for implementation and resourcing. If the design issue is accepted, but no required bill payers have been identified, the issue undergoes a formal FIFA that will result in a recommendation to implement, return to TRADOC, or send to TAA to compete for resourcing. If and when the design is approved by the VCSA, FDD forwards the URS along with any design guidance from the FDU process to USAFMSA for TOE and MTOE development.

Why is knowledge of the organization design process important for the FA 50 officer? Almost all DTMLPF solutions for capability gaps will have some effect on one or more Army organizations. Changes to existing or creation of new organizations can be as minor as changing one MOS or as major as standing up entirely new units with newly developed equipment. FA 50 officers recommending solutions to overcome capability gaps must factor in the time and expense required to accomplish organization design changes and need to bring key organization design and documentation personnel early into the planning cycle to expedite those changes.

The current FDU process is very efficient and streamlined to respond to changing organization design recommendations. An FDD-hosted web site with an archive of previous FDU decisions and the status of ongoing FDU issues would be a useful addition to the process. For additional information on the organization design process, FA 50 officers can refer to either TRADOC Pam 71-9 or draft TRADOC Pam 71-20 which is currently being staffed prior to approval and will replace TRADOC Pam 71-9.

Rick Dodson

Rick Dodson is a graduate of FA 50 Class 05-01. Mr. Dodson works at Fort Leavenworth as a management analyst in the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff Officers Course, the Army: Management Staff College, and numerous other military and civilian technical and leadership courses. Before retiring in 2002, Mr. Dodson served 28 years in the active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve. Contact him at rick.dodson@us.army.mil.

THE EVOLUTION OF FORCE MANAGEMENT

Change requires the Army to remain capable in an environment of technological advancements, internal management variances and a world in turmoil. The management of change is an evolving process that must have focus and methodology to support the Army's vision, imperatives, core competencies and enduring values. Paragraph 1-17, Field Manual 100-11

There is a feeling throughout our country that the military is a different breed of animal from our massive industrial machine. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The way a corporate president runs his company is very much the same as the way generals run their divisions. They all are managers tasked with completing a mission. What they do to accomplish this is to manage their resources.

It is a part of American culture to be asked by friends, family and strangers you meet: What you do for a living? When I reply that I am a Force Management Analyst it invariably prompts the question: "What is Force Management?"


Of course I stifle the urge to reply: "It is managing the force", and launch into a lengthy explanation that basically states that Force Management is present in every company in the world, from the Mom and Pop Grocery on the corner to General Motors to General Dynamics. All businesses, all governments and even religions have processes that, when they are boiled down, are nothing more than Force Management---running the business; coping with change. If we substitute the name of any company in the quote written above from FM 100-11 for "the Army" you would have a mission statement that could be used throughout that company or for that matter for any business.

If we are honest with ourselves and look underneath the façade of history we will see that everywhere there is or was an organization there are force managers. Attila didn't wing it all the time. Someone has to decide who to hire and fire, where to obtain supplies, how to structure and staff manufacturing (or maneuver) entities and how to fund it all. There is no entity that remains constant year to year. You must adjust to the variegations of business. This is Force Management in its embryonic form. We, the Army and America's businesses, expand and contract these basics to fit the needs of our specific entities.

Even though it has always been there, Army Force Management has been refined over the years into a specialty area and designated Functional Area (FA) 50: Force Development. It first emerged as a specialty in the early 1970s. The 1 March 1974 revision of Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3 lists Operations and Force Development as one of the over fifty branches, primary specialties, basic entry specialties and advanced entry specialties.

The 1 September 1977 revision to DA PAM 600-3 assigned each of the forty-six specialties a distinct code. At that time Specialty Code (SC) 54 was assigned to the Operations and Force Development specialty. This specialty was to change in the next revision, 1 November 1981, of DA PAM 600-3 to Operations and Plans. It was from this specialty code that Functional Area 50 would emerge.

FUNCTIONAL LIFE CYCLE MODEL OF THE ARMY



On 1 October 1984 the Army released its second Officer Personnel Management Study (OPMS II). This study recommended as one of its short-term management goals, that ODCSPER eliminate specialty codes and establish Functional Areas (FA). It made several additional recommendations with regard to managing Functional Areas including making MILPERCEN responsible for managing officers to include FA designation, compatibility, skill attainment through education and assignment.

This study recommended increasing the number Functional Areas (previously called specialties) from nine to fourteen. In doing so it created a new functional area, FA 50: Force Development. These changes were documented in the 30 September 1986 update to DA PAM 600-3.

Recognizing the importance of force management to the running of the Army, the then Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), General Dennis J. Reimer, commissioned a Force Management Functional Area Assessment. The assessment, in conjunction with the United States Army Force Management Study of 30 June 1993, recommended the establishment of the Army Force Management School (AFMS) to be the primary educational tool for advancing force management studies.

The school taught its first class on 1 October 1994. The maximum class size was set at sixty students with fifty being the optimum. There was a minimum of twenty-five students required for a class. The course was to be a resident course and taught six times per year with a length of three weeks. In addition to this course there were several publications that were germane to the understanding of Army Force Management.

Field Manual (FM) 100-11: Force Integration was revised on 15 January 1995. This revision defines doctrine that supports the Army's Title 10 mission to provide a trained, organized and adequately equipped force capable of prompt and sustained combat operations.

Published on 15 December 1995, Army Regulation (AR) 11-40: Functional Area Assessment (FAA) was a long overdue revision to this important regulation critical to proper force management. An FAA allows senior Army leaders to identify and resolve issues, which affect the execution of Headquarters (HQ), Department of the Army (DA) short-range plans and programs. It also provide a teaching mechanism and forum for the horizontal and vertical exchange of information between the DA and major Army command (MACOM) participants, focusing primarily on the Army's ability to maintain readiness, force capability, and force modernization in the program objective memorandum (POM) years.

Also published this year was a revision to AR 71-11: Total Army Analysis (TAA). First issued on 1 November 1982, this 29 December 1995 update was long overdue. This regulation prescribes objectives, procedures, and responsibilities for TAA and associated force management activities.

Army Regulation 71-9: Material Requirements was issued on 30 April 1997. This regulation establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for the identification of materiel warfighting requirements, preparing requirements documents to acquire warfighting systems and training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators and for conducting supporting analyses.

OPMS XXI, now called OPMS III, was published on 9 July 1997. It announced the formation of Functional Areas, Career Fields and the long awaited single-track officer management system. This study also recommended that several new functional areas be established. Among these was Functional Area 50: Strategy and Force Development (now Force Management). This functional area was formed from elements of FA 54: Operations and Force Development, which was recommended for elimination. FA 50 was placed in the Institutional Support (IS) Career Field.

In order to keep pace with the rapidly changing dynamics of the modern Army FM 100-11: Force Integration, although only three years old, was revised and reissued on 15 January 1998.

On 15 July 1998 the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) published a memorandum outlining upcoming changes to DA PAM 611-21: Military Occupational Classification and Structure. This memorandum established FA 50: Strategy and Force Management (note that Force Development has been changed here to Force Management) to identify positions and personnel requiring knowledge in core institutional force capabilities. It established the proponent of this functional area as the Combined Arms Command (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The 1 October 1998 revision of DA PAM 600-3 legitimized most of the recommendations made by OPMS III, including the name change of FA 50. It fixed the number of functional areas at eighteen and the branches at twenty-five. It also defined the role of the four career fields and made it possible for officers to compete against one another for promotion with other officers of similar training and background.

This revision defines the core role of Force Management to: develop, generate, project, sustain, direct and resource the force. It also changes the proponent for FA 50 from the CAC at Fort Leavenworth to the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS).

It is curious to note that in the 31 March 1999 issue of DA PAM 611-21: Military Occupational Classification and Structure the section devoted to FA 50 is marked “(Rescinded)”. Since there are two AOC (50A and 50B) that are unaccounted for in the rest of this pamphlet it can only be assumed that there was a miscommunication between DA PAM 611-21 and DA PAM 600-3. FA 50 appears in the on-line posting of the current AR 611-21 SMARTBOOK.

On 31 December 1999 FA 50 had an initial authorization of 181 officers and in April 2000 the first Force Management Rand Fellowship was granted. This fellowship began in August 2000, was certified in July 2001 and by 31 December 2001 the functional area had grown to a level of 210 officers.

FA 50 officer qualification training encompasses several different phases. The four-week “How the Army Runs” course at Fort Belvoir initially qualifies officers for FA 50 designation. Further training is accomplished by completing the FA 50 Qualification Course. This course was conceptualized and a cost estimate briefed in August 2003 with the Army Force Management School developing the course in November 2003. The pilot course was taught in June 2004. There are also available several other venues for advanced schooling such as the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

In August of 2002 the FA 50 proponentry entered into an agreement with George Mason University that allows FA 50 officers to obtain a Masters in Business Administration (MBA). The first class of six majors began study in August 2002 and graduated in December 2003.

Nicholas L. Cerchio III